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The Japanese government turns a blind eye to the country’s colonial 
and second world war misdeeds – so 
goes the oft-heard criticism that peri-
odically creates tension throughout the 
Far East. Jane Yamazaki, however, chal-
lenges the view that Japan has never 
apologised for past crimes, and argues 
instead that the rest of the world has 
turned a deaf ear on repeated Japanese 
expressions of regret. In recent decades 
Tokyo has apologised several times in 
different ways ranging from merely 
making excuses to expressing sincere 
regret. The problem often lies in lan-
guage, since Japanese can be difficult to 
translate or leave a lot of room for inter-
pretation. Yamazaki, therefore, not only 
details the history of Japan’s multiple 
apologies; concentrating on the years 
between 1984 and 1995, she also analy-
ses their rhetoric and translates differ-
ent expressions.
From ‘hansei’ to ‘chinsha’: 
how to say ‘sorry’
Yamazaki begins her chronology of 
Japanese apologies with the 1965 
normalisation of relations with South 
Korea, when Foreign Minister Shiina 
Etsusaburô expressed ‘true regret’ 
(‘makoto ni ikan’) and ‘deep remorse’ 
(‘fukaku hansei’) over an ‘unfortunate 
period in our countries’ history’. Japan 
later used the same term in a joint com-
muniqué when it normalised relations 
with China in 1972: ‘The Japanese side 
is keenly conscious of the responsibil-
ity for the serious damage that Japan 
caused in the past to the Chinese peo-
ple through war, and deeply reproach-
es itself [fukaku hansei]’. ‘Hansei’ 
(‘remorse’, ‘reflection’) is actually a 
weak expression of apology. Even soft-
er was Emperor Hirohito’s reference to 
Japan’s treatment of China during the 
second world war while visiting Presi-
dent Ford in 1975: ‘The peoples of both 
countries...endured a brief, unfortu-
nate ordeal as storms raged in the usu-
ally quiet Pacific’. Three years later, 
when Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiao 
Ping visited Japan, Hirohito referred to 
the past by merely saying, ‘At one time, 
there were unfortunate events between 
our countries’.
In 1982 a controversy erupted over 
alleged revisions of Japanese history in 
school textbooks. Following what was 
perceived by many as Japan’s less than 
diplomatic handling of the situation, 
violent reactions occurred in China 
and South Korea. The rising tensions 
induced Japanese politicians to apolo-
gise more clearly, though they still used 
the rather lightweight ‘hansei’. In 1985, 
for example, on the United Nations’ 
40th anniversary, Prime Minister Naka-
sone Yasuhiro declared, ‘Since the end 
of the war, Japan has profoundly regret-
ted [kibishiku hansei] the unleash-
ing of rampant ultra nationalism and 
militarism and the war that brought 
great devastation to the people of many 
countries around the world and to our 
country as well’. While regretting past 
wrongs, Yasuhiro stressed that Japan 
had suffered, too, a tactic repeated by 
other politicians.
The stronger ‘owabi’ (‘apology’) was 
first expressed in 1990, by Prime Min-
ister Kaifu Toshiki to South Korean 
President Roh, and has been used regu-
larly since: ‘...the people of the Korean 
peninsula experienced unbearable grief 
and suffering because of actions of our 
country...[we/I] are humbly remorse-
ful [hansei] on this and wish to note 
our frank feelings of apology [owabi]’. 
Simultaneously, however, Japan stub-
bornly denied maintaining second world 
war ‘comfort stations’ with forced pros-
titutes, most of them Korean. Cornered 
by Japanese historians, Cabinet Secre-
tary Katô Kôichi publicly apologised 
to the ‘victims’ (‘higaisha’) in January 
1992. Visiting Korea the same month, 
Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi even 
called Japan the ‘aggressor/perpetrator’ 
(‘kagaisha’). 
Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro’s 
August 1993 apology resembled Kaifu’s 
in 1990, but with one addition that other 
politicians later reiterated several times: 
that Japan ‘will demonstrate a new deter-
mination by contributing more than 
ever before to world peace’. Hosokawa’s 
cabinet included three ministers of the 
Socialist Party, which had been calling 
for reconciliation with other Asian peo-
ples and ‘sincere Japanese apologies to 
achieve that goal’. In Korea in Novem-
ber 1993, Hosokawa ‘apologised from 
the heart’ (‘chinsha’) for ‘Japan’s past 
colonial rule’, calling his country the 
aggressor/perpetrator (‘kagaisha’). The 
Japanese public approved of his men-
tion of ‘aggression’ and ‘colonial rule’, 
but conservatives bristled. Having gone 
beyond what fellow party members and 
his coalition government were willing 
to admit, Hosokawa was at times forced 
to backtrack. Nevertheless, the next 
Prime Minister, Hata Tsutomu, uttered 
almost the same words in a May 1994 
Diet speech. 
In August 1995, as the 50th anniver-
sary of the second world war’s end 
approached, the Socialist Murayama 
Tomiichi led a coalition government 
that included his long-time enemy, the 
conservative LDP. A known pacifist 
and advocate of non-alignment, neu-
trality and a closer relationship with 
Asian nations, Murayama apologised 
no differently than Kaifu, Miyazawa or 
Hosokawa had, yet the world took him 
much more seriously. Ironically, his 
stature as an apology advocate under-
mined his own government’s recogni-
tion of his apology: after a long debate 
and vociferous right wing pressure, 
the resulting Diet resolution was so 
watered down that the word ‘apology’ 
didn’t even appear. This reinforced the 
outside world’s impression that Japan 
had never apologised at all. Later prime 
ministers, all of them conservative, 
restated Murayama’s apology almost 
verbatim.
The politics of apologia: Why 
say sorry?
Other nations also hate to apologise for 
wrongdoings, the author writes, and 
cites as an example the long overdue 
American apology to Japanese-Ameri-
cans for their internment during the 
second world war. She finds Ameri-
can and British apologies are typically 
selective and ignore broader cases such 
as slavery, the use of napalm in Viet-
nam or the British Opium War. Indeed, 
when France passed a law, in February 
2005, requiring history education in 
schools and universities to emphasise 
the ‘positive role’ of the French colonial 
presence on other continents, it spurred 
harsh criticism by the French left and 
vehement protests in the countries 
concerned, above all in Algeria and the 
Antilles.
As for Japan, Yamazaki admits that its 
apologies are sometimes expressed 
only in a general way concerning war-
fare, aggression, war atrocities or colo-
nial rule, but she also provides several 
examples of apology for specific violent 
events or practices, such as the Nanking 
massacre, biochemical warfare, sexual 
slavery, and mistreatment of allied sol-
diers and civilians. Japan’s reasons for 
apologising, according to Yamazaki, 
are several: to repair relations with 
Asian countries; to stimulate national 
self-reflection and a learning process 
leading to a new, improved identity; to 
affirm moral principles. She also cites 
the historian Yoshida Yutaka, who sees 
apologies and other conciliatory strate-
gies as motivated by the Japanese ambi-
tion to assert leadership in Asia. But the 
domestic call for self-reflection is also 
motivated by opposition parties or new 
administrations who wish to criticise 
previous ones – most clearly demon-
strated by Prime Minister Hosokawa in 
1993. 
Japanese left-wing groups, unlike con-
servatives, are vehemently antimilitaris-
tic and see the second world war as an 
instance of Japanese imperialism. Advo-
cating closer ties with China, Korea and 
other Asian countries, they consistently 
demand a more remorseful stance and 
compensation for victims of Japanese 
aggression. The different political atti-
tudes – conservative versus left-wing 
– are also reflected in the choice of 
expressions: ‘comfort women’ versus 
‘sex slaves’, ‘Nanking incident’ versus 
‘Nanking massacre’, ‘China Incident’ 
versus ‘China War’. Yamazaki sees the 
conservative aversion to apology as an 
expression of a masochistic view of his-
tory and also of a fear that apologising 
would imply the Emperor’s responsibil-
ity, if not culpability. But she neglects to 
sufficiently address conservatives’ fear 
that admission of guilt would invite 
demands for compensation.
Appearing unrepentant
The author believes that the South 
Korean government was ready to accept 
Japan’s 1965 apology – its ‘hansei’ on 
the occasion of normalising relations – 
but that the Korean public was not. The 
Chinese government’s situation was 
similar, she says, but it later changed 
its attitude. Unfortunately, Yamazaki’s 
study ends with the year 1995, after 
which the Chinese repeatedly cam-
paigned to blame Japan for its alleged 
lack of sensibility.
Other Asian countries believe Japan 
shouldn’t feel guilty or apologise at all. 
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma 
and Indonesia have taken a neutral atti-
tude, holding that Japan should concen-
trate on present and future problems 
instead of wasting time and energy on 
historiographical reflection. They sup-
port the position of Japanese apolo-
gists, who claim that the second world 
war was fought for the liberation of Asia 
from white domination. Taiwan’s reti-
cence, meanwhile, probably reflects its 
ambivalence toward its former coloniser 
(1895-1945), close economic partner and 
ally in its campaign for recognition as 
the legitimate government of China, at 
least until Taipei lost that fight in 1972. 
Though the author herself admits that 
some Japanese apologies have been 
insufficient, her evidence that they 
have been expressed is convincing. 
But the period covered by Yamazaki’s 
study ended over ten years ago. Since 
that time, regardless of any apologies 
expressed, Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
numerous visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
and the Ministry of Education’s approv-
al of controversial textbooks, (in 2001 
and 2005), that present a ‘new view’ of 
national history, have renewed a per-
ception of Japan as unrepentant. Still, 
Yamazaki’s book is a valuable response 
to the question of how Japan has dealt 
with its own history and of how the 
world has, or has not, responded. <
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South Korean chil-
dren taking part in 
anti-Japanese demon-
strations.
Prime Minister 
Koizumi still visits 
the controversial 
Yasukuni Shrine.
